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Accurately inferring three-dimensional (3D) structure from only a cross-section through that structure is not
possible. However, many observers seem to be unaware of this fact. We present evidence for a 3D amodal
completion process that may explain this phenomenon and provide new insights into how the perceptual system
processes 3D structures. Across four experiments, observers viewed cross-sections of common objects and reported
whether regions visible on the surface extended into the object. If they reported that the region extended, they
were asked to indicate the orientation of extension or that the 3D shape was unknowable from the cross-section.
Across Experiments 1, 2, and 3, participants frequently inferred 3D forms from surface views, showing a specific prior
to report that regions in the cross-section extend straight back into the object, with little variance in orientation. In
Experiment 3, we examined whether 3D visual inferences made from cross-sections are similar to other cases of
amodal completion by examining how the inferences were influenced by observers’ knowledge of the objects.
Finally, in Experiment 4, we demonstrate that these systematic visual inferences are unlikely to result from demand
characteristics or response biases. We argue that these 3D visual inferences have been largely unrecognized by the
perception community, and have implications for models of 3D visual completion and science education.
Keywords: Perception of 3D volumes, Amodal completion, Spatial reasoning, STEM educationSignificance
Practitioners of science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics (STEM) disciplines such as radiologists, ge-
ologists, and surgeons often have to make inferences
about the three-dimensional (3D) structure of objects
(organs, rocks, tumors) from two-dimensional (2D) sur-
face views such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
slices or outcrops of rock. These inferences represent a
challenging visual problem that has not been explored in
the literature on amodal visual completion. Additionally,
these inferences can be challenging for students, and un-
derstanding why they are difficult has the potential to in-
form education. In this paper, we present data that
suggest specific priors in how observers infer 3D struc-
tures from 2D cross-sections; these priors influence both
the accuracy of observers’ inferences and recognition of* Correspondence: kristin.gagnier@jhu.edu
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifwhen accurate inferences are not possible. These priors
have implications for theories of visual processing and
also in science education for how to develop effective
pedagogical approaches to teaching students to make in-
ferences about the 3D structures from 2D cross-
sections.Visual Completion from 2D Cross-Sections: Impli-
cations for Visual Theory and STEM Education
and Practice
If you inspect the rust-colored lines on each side of the
rock in Fig. 1, no doubt you will have the impression of
planar layers of mineral in the marble. Observers seem
to have no difficulty connecting the similar-colored lines
on each side, and making an inference about how they
extend into the rock. Notice that we use the term infer-
ence here because one cannot actually see the planar
form inside the rock. This may seem like a trivial
achievement. In this case, accurately inferring the 3D
shape of the layers from the surface features is possibleis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
Fig. 1 Two orthogonal faces of planar layers of marble. By
inspecting both the top and side, it is possible to infer that the rust-
colored forms that appear as lines on each face are the visible
expression of 3D planar layers that extend through the object
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structure may be inferred by filling in the plane between
the lines. However, consider the problem if only a single
side were visible, as is the case in a single cross-sectional
view of any object. In this case, the single planar layer of
marble would appear as a line on the surface; however,
the line would provide no information about the orienta-
tion of the internal layer.
To illustrate, we provide an example outside of geol-
ogy and invite the reader to consider the slice of bread
shown in Fig. 2a. Most people report a clear impression
that the cinnamon layer extends straight back into the
slice, often arguing, “How could it be otherwise; surely
the bread was baked with a layer that extended from one
end to the other.” This logic is faulty, as it assumes (a)
completely regular dough thickness during the rolling of
dough and cinnamon, (b) perfect alignment of the
shaped dough with the pan, and (c) completely isotropic
rising. More importantly, in this case, it is incorrect. The
dip1 of the cinnamon is shown in Fig. 2b; the cinnamon
extends into this slice at a dip angle of 60°, not 90°.Fig. 2 Image of a slice of raisin bread. a Participants indicated if the region
into the object. b The inside of the bread showing the angle at which the
Participants never saw this viewHere we present work on a class of 3D visual infer-
ences that has not received much attention in the visual
perception community – inferring the 3D interior struc-
ture of an object from surface features and possible con-
straints on these inferences. This visual task is important
for many science, technology, engineering, and mathem-
atics (STEM) disciplines in which 3D structures are
measured or displayed using a series of cross-sections.
(For example, a radiologist infers the 3D structure of a
tumor from MRI scan slices, and a geologist infers 3D
structures in the Earth from outcrops visible on the sur-
face.) This task is challenging for students (Kali & Orion,
1996) and experts (Bond, Lunn, Shipton, & Lunn, 2012)
alike. Understanding visual inferences about 3D struc-
tures can offer insights into principles of visual process-
ing and has implications for STEM education and
practice. Our aims are to begin to characterize visual in-
ferences about 3D structure from surface features and to
highlight the similarity between this inference and amo-
dal completion (Kanizsa, 1979; Michotte, Thinès, &
Crabbé, 1964).
Background
A central problem in midlevel vision is to understand
how the visual system uses light projected onto a 2-
dimensional (2D) surface to represent 3-dimensional
(3D) properties of the world. Our world is 3D, and
thus we have to mentally represent and process the
3D structure of objects. Yet, the retinal image is flat,
so the 3D structure of an object has to be inferred by
the visual system. Much of the work on this problem
has been focused broadly on the question of how
spatial relations are recovered from the 2D retinal
projection. Seminal work on this problem has identi-
fied how 3D shape is inferred from stereoscopic dis-
parity (Marr & Poggio, 1976), edges (Marr &
Hildreth, 1980), contour shape (Marr & Nishihara,
1978; Ullman, 1989), shading (Buelthoff & Yuille,
1991; Hayward, 1998), silhouette (Koenderink & Vanhighlighted by the red line was present on the surface or extended
highlighted region extends into the object (indicated with a red line).
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Wallach & O’Connell, 1953), and textural gradients
(Gibson, 1950), collectively referred to as shape-from-
X (Buelthoff & Yuille, 1991).
The problem of inferring the 3D shape from a cross-
section is similar to other 3D shape-from-X problems
where observers have to make inferences about the 3D
shape from limited perceptual information. Despite the
inherent ambiguity of structures visible on a cross-
sectional surface, observers may nevertheless have clear
and systematic impressions of the shape and orientation
these structures take as they extend into the object. The
possibility that observers have clear and systematic im-
pressions of how regions extend into cross-sections, or
priors, first came to our attention in discussions with ge-
ologists, who noted that their students often reported
that geological structures seen in an outcrop (a cross-
section of rock) extended straight back into the rock
(Kali & Orion, 1996). The purpose of the work presented
in this paper is to examine the generality and implica-
tions of this observation.
We borrow the term prior from the Bayesian frame-
work, which models decision-making under uncertainty.
This framework has been applied successfully to under-
standing the role of prior knowledge in visual percep-
tion, as well as perceptual illusions and constancies (Kali
& Orion, 1996). This work proposes that experience on
a personal or evolutionary time scale supports uncon-
scious statistical inferences (Helmholtz, 1867) about the
probability of the environment’s being a particular way,
given specific sensory input. For example, in apparent
motion, there is a specific prior to infer a straight path
between objects that successively appear in different lo-
cations, unless the objects are biological, where curved
paths may be more likely (Heptulla-Chatterjee, Freyd, &
Shiffrar, 1996). In such a case, priors may reveal some-
thing about the statistical likelihood of objects or events
in the environment.
Across four experiments, we examined visual infer-
ences from structures visible only in cross-sectional
views (e.g., the rust-colored lines in Fig. 1 and the
cinnamon swirl in Fig. 2). We showed undergraduate
psychology students photographs (Experiments 1 and
2) or 3D objects (Experiment 3) where a single sur-
face was visible and asked for their impression of
how a specific region extended into the object. We
examined whether (a) observers tended to infer 3D
forms from single surface views or whether this
phenomenon was restricted to a few rocks or geology
students, (b) there is a prior to infer regions visible
in a cross-section as extending back into the object at
90°, (c) observers can correctly infer the 3D structure
if given sufficient information, and (d) the visual in-
ferences made from cross-sections occur in spite ofworld knowledge and thus may be similar to the vis-
ual inferences seen in amodal completion (Kanizsa &
Gerbino, 1982; Michotte et al., 1964), where struc-
tures that are not visible are inferred from visible
structures.
To preview our results, in Experiments 1, 2, and 3, ob-
servers did indeed report regions in cross-sections as ex-
tending straight back into the object at 90°. However, in
Experiment 2, when observers were given sufficient in-
formation, they were generally correct in their inferences
and thus did not show evidence of this prior. Finally, in
Experiments 3 and 4, we show that this prior is not ad-
justed by memory or beliefs, suggesting similarities with
amodal completion. We argue that this prior to report
regions as extending straight back is revealing about
how the perceptual system processes information about
the interior of objects from information on the object’s
surface and is relevant to STEM education where stu-
dents learn about interior structures from cross-sections.Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to describe naïve ob-
servers’ reports of the internal structure of objects in-
ferred from surface patterns. Do observers (a) report 3D
forms, and, if so, (b) how do they report those regions as
continuing into the object? Observers viewed photo-
graphs of cross-sections of everyday objects (rocks,
wood, food) and indicated whether a region highlighted
with a red line (shown in Fig. 2a) was present only on
the surface or whether it extended into the object. If
they thought it extended into the object, they used a bar
attached to an inclinometer to show the angle of exten-
sion. If participants tended to infer regions in a cross-
section as extending straight back in three dimensions,
then we would expect dip estimates to cluster near 90°.
If inferences of cross-sections are not systematic, then
we would expect to see a wide range of estimates of ex-
tension (e.g., some estimates at 45°, some at 170°).
Anticipating there might be some individual differ-
ences, we sought to determine whether there was a
relationship between the estimated dip angle and per-
formance on measures of spatial reasoning about per-
spective and orientation of 3D forms. We hypothesized
that observers who performed better at measures of
spatial reasoning might be more likely to recognize that
one cannot know the true 3D shape from a single cross-
sectional view.Methods
Participants
Participants were 30 Temple University undergraduates
(19 females) fulfilling a requirement for an introductory
psychology course.
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The stimuli consisted of 17 color photographs cross-
sections of common objects such as food, wood, and
rocks, as shown in Fig. 2a. One practice image (a
Swiss roll) and 16 experimental images were used.
Stimuli fell into three categories: (a) biological [fruits
(n = 3); wood (n = 2); vegetable, fish, and meat (n = 2)],
(b) geological [rocks (n = 4)], and (c) analogues to igne-
ous rocks—these are food products that were originally
liquid and are now solid (blue cheese, chocolate with
almonds, and cinnamon bread). The images were ap-
proximately 25 × 18 cm when presented on the screen.
These categories were selected because the internal
structure of the objects ranged from highly structured
and constrained by the environment (e.g., wood grain)
to relatively unconstrained (e.g., minerals in rock), and
thus the angle of extension into the object is either pre-
dictable within a certain range or completely unpredict-
able. For example, the internal structure of wood is
constrained by the environment. As tree structures are
generally concentric cylinders, the extension into a block
of wood is a function of the angle of the cut relative to
the cylinders. The internal composition of rocks can be
structured, but the orientation of a mineral’s surface
relative to the cutting plane is essentially arbitrary, and
thus the 3D structure is unpredictable from a single
cross-section. This is also true for geologically analogous
stimuli such as nuts in chocolate—the orientation of the
nut relative to the orientation of the cut is arbitrary.
These objects were chosen with two additional con-
straints: (a) that we were physically able to slice each ob-
ject and measure the true angle at which each
highlighted region extended into the object, and (b) that
we included a variety of objects that might be familiar to
participants.
Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a 20-inch Dell monitor. As
shown in Fig. 3a, the monitor was positioned parallel to
the ground.Fig. 3 a: The display used in Experiment 1. Participants used the black bar
into the object. b: The display used in Experiment 2Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a well-
illuminated room. They viewed each picture while stand-
ing with both eyes open and positioned over the center
of the monitor (as shown in Fig. 3a). Participants were
told that we were interested in their opinions of how re-
gions continue in three dimensions. They were told that
sometimes they would see pictures where they might
have a strong sense that a region continued and some-
times they might have a sense that something was
present only on the surface. To illustrate these, students
were shown a cross-section of the front of a Swiss roll (a
filled pastry with alternating layers of chocolate cake and
cream) and crayon marks on paper. All students re-
ported the layers of the Swiss roll as extending into the
object while the crayon marks were present on the
surface.
Observers were then shown 16 pictures. For each, they
indicated whether the region indicated with a red line
was present only on the surface (like the crayon marks
on the paper) or extended into the object (like the Swiss
Roll). If they thought the region extended into the ob-
ject, they indicated the orientation using a stainless steel
bar with an attached inclinometer (to measure angle).
Participants placed the end of the bar on the red line
and then moved the bar to indicate the angle. The 0°
was defined relative to the ground plane (i.e., if the bar
was angled straight down, as shown in Fig. 3a, the angle
measurement was 90°). After this, they reported their
confidence in their response on a 5-point scale (5 indi-
cates “extremely confident”). Prior to viewing the 16 pic-
tures, participants practiced orienting the bar on the
image of the Swiss roll.
To be sure that there were no differences in the esti-
mates based on the orientation of the picture, partici-
pants viewed all 16 pictures in their original orientation
and rotated 180°. This allowed us to calculate any bias
due to body position relative to the image. Finally, par-
ticipants were shown the pictures a third time and asked
to identify each picture. For any response given a confi-
dence rating of 0 or 1, we further probed theto indicate the orientation at which the highlighted region extended
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following reasons best described their confidence rating:
(a) they have no idea what the orientation could be, (b)
the orientation is not knowable from the picture, or (c)
there could be a range of possible orientations at which
the region extended into the object. After this, partici-
pants completed three measures of spatial reasoning.Measures of Spatial Reasoning
The Geologic Block Cross-Sectioning Test (GBCT;
Ormand et al., 2014) is a measure of visualizing volu-
metric forms from cross-sections. Participants were
given 8 minutes to complete 14 problems in which they
had to select the cross-section that resulted from a pic-
tured cut into a geologic block diagram (as shown in
Fig. 4).
The Object Perspective Taking Test (Kozhevnikov &
Hegarty, 2001) is a test in visualizing the locations of ob-
jects when seen from a specific perspective. A configur-
ation of seven objects is shown, and participants imagine
standing at the position of one object, facing another ob-
ject, and they indicate the direction to a third object.
Participants had 5 minutes to complete 12 questions,
and the dependent measure is angular error.
The Peters and colleagues (1995) paper-and-pencil
version of the Vandenberg and Kuse (1978) Mental Rota-
tion Test measures skill in visualizing objects after they
are rotated. Observers viewed five line drawings of 3D
forms similar to those used by Shepard and Metzler
(1971). The target form is on the left, and four answer
choices are presented on the right. For each problem,
participants identify the two choices that are identical
but rotated versions of the target form. The test has 2
parts with 12 problems each, and participants were given
3 minutes to complete each half.Unbiased Estimate Measurement
To calculate the participant’s unbiased estimate for each
picture, we combined the two estimates by calculating
the average of the first estimate and 180° minus the sec-
ond estimate (when the picture was rotated 180°).Fig. 4 An example of a problem from the Geologic Block Cross-SectioningOverall, participants exhibited a bias of 4.1° toward their
body.
Results and Discussion
Participants were fairly confident that the 3D form could
be determined from a cross-sectional view. In 74 % of
the trials, they reported the region as “going into” the
object and gave an estimate of dip with a mean confi-
dence of 3.2 (SD 1.1). There was variation across images.
Dip estimates were given most often for the salmon
cross-section (97 % of the trials) and least often for the
papaya cross-section (37 %).
Figure 5a shows the true dip angle (how the highlighted
region actually extended into the object) and participants’
mean dip estimate for each picture. Although there is a
wide range of true dip angles, participants reported re-
gions as extending straight back into the object. Fifteen of
the 16 pictures have mean dip estimates that are not sig-
nificantly different from 90°.2 Figure 5b shows the fre-
quency distribution of dip estimates across all pictures.
The estimates cluster near 90°, with relatively little vari-
ability: 76 % of responses were within 10° of 90°. When
participants reported the regions as extending into the ob-
ject, they said the regions extended straight back.
Next, we examined performance on our three mea-
sures of spatial reasoning. The mean number correct on
the GBCT was 3.9 (SD 2.0) out of 14. The mean angular
error for the Object Perspective Taking Test was 52.2
(SD 26.3).3 The mean number correct on the Mental Ro-
tations Test was 7.4 (SD 3.3) out of 24. Performance on
the spatial measures did not predict the mean dip angle
estimates (R2 = .005, F < 1). This is perhaps not surprising,
given the limited range of reported dip angles; most regions
were reported as extending straight back into the objects.
In sum, the responses indicated a prior to infer struc-
tures visible in a single cross-section extending straight
back into the object at 90°. This was not limited to
rocks, but occurred for familiar objects.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we further probed the nature of the
prior. We reasoned that perhaps observers knew thatTest and corresponding answer choices (a-d). The correct answer is A
Fig. 5 a The mean dip estimates (dark gray) for each picture along with the correct dip angle for each picture (light gray) in Experiment 1. Note
that dip angle is defined relative to the plane of the picture. A report of a region as continuing “straight back” would be a dip estimate of 90°. b
Frequency distribution of responses that fell within 10° angle bins in Experiment 1
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single cross-sectional view, but because they were given
only two answer choices (surface vs. extends in), they
were prevented from expressing this knowledge. To ad-
dress this, participants in Experiment 2 selected one of
the following answer choices for each picture: (a) the re-
gion extends into the object, and I can show you the
angle of extension; (b) the region is present only on the
surface; (c) the region extends in, but from the picture
you cannot know how it extends in; and (d) from the
picture, you cannot tell if the region extends in or is on
the surface (i.e., the answer is unknowable). As in Experi-
ment 2, we examined whether there was a relationship be-
tween spatial reasoning performance and how likely a
participant was to understand the uncertainty of a cross-
sectional view. We also changed the orientation of the
image to be sure that the effect observed in Experiment 1
was not dependent on the particulars of the viewing per-
spective. In Experiment 2, participants viewed the screen
oriented perpendicular to the ground and indicated their
dip estimates from this position (as shown in Fig. 3b).
Finally, we included two additional types of stimuli. First,
we added five additional pictures in which the region was
present only on the surface to serve as a check to ensure
participants were using our dependent measure correctly.
Second, after giving their responses to the pictures, partici-
pants viewed 3D models of layers of Play-Doh (as shown
in Fig. 6). As observers could see how a region shown on
the top extended in three dimensions by also looking at
the cross-section on the side, we could determine if partic-
ipants could correctly infer the orientation of extension
when given sufficient information to solve the problem.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 55 Temple University undergraduates
(29 females) fulfilling a requirement for an introductory
psychology course.Fig. 6 One of the Play-Doh models used in Experiment 2. For each,
a layer was indicated with a colored and numbered sticker.
Participants oriented a bar attached to an inclinometer and used
this to show the angle at which the layer extended into the modelStimuli
The 16 stimuli from Experiment 1 were used with the
addition of 5 new pictures that presented regions
present only on the surface (e.g., moss on wood, markers
on paper, paint on wood). Participants also viewed eight
Play-Doh models (see Fig. 6). These were Play-Doh
models consisting of different colored layers that had
been transformed in various ways, such as folded or
tilted. The Play-Doh models ranged in size from 2 × 6 ×
4 cm to 5 × 8 × 6 cm (height × width × depth).
Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch Tobii 1750 (Tobii,
Stockholm, Sweden) eye tracker screen (eye tracking
data were not collected for this experiment). As shown
in Fig. 3b, participants made their estimates sitting with
their line of sight parallel to the ground and were seated
approximately 45 cm away from the screen.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to that in Experiment 1, with
the following exceptions. Participants viewed 21 pictures
in an original and 180° rotation while seated at a desk
and the monitor was positioned in front of them. For
each picture, they selected one of the following answer
choices and then indicated their confidence: (a) the re-
gion extended into the object and they could use a bar
to show the angle of extension; (b) the region was
present only on the surface; (c) the region extended into
the object, but from the picture they could not know
how; or (d) from the picture, one cannot know whether
the region extends into the object or is present only on
the surface (i.e., answer is unknowable). Observers then
viewed eight Play-Doh models in physical space (not on
a computer screen). For each model, a layer was indi-
cated with a small sticker (see Fig. 6), and observers ori-
ented a bar to show how the layer extended into the
model.
Results and Discussion
As in Experiment 1, participants were fairly confident
that the 3D orientation of the region could be deter-
mined from a single cross-sectional view; mean confi-
dence was 3.7 (SD .97). Even when participants were
explicitly asked if the answer could be determined
from the information in the picture, they reported the
region as “going in” on 56 % of trials (dip estimates
were given on 37 % of the trials, and on 19 % of the
trials participants reported that the region “extended
into the object but from the picture one cannot know
how”). Overall, fewer dip estimates were given in Ex-
periment 2 than in Experiment 1. Estimates were
most likely for the cinnamon bread (71 % of the tri-
als) and least likely for gneiss with garnet (11 % of
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not be determined in only 7 % of the trials. On aver-
age, the images of material on surfaces (e.g., moss on
wood) were reported as extending into the object in
only 8 % of trials, suggesting that participants under-
stood and used our rating scale appropriately.
We replicated the dip angle findings of Experiment 1;
participants consistently reported regions extending
straight back into the object. Figure 7a shows the mean
dip estimate and the correct dip angle for each picture.
As in Experiment 1, there is a wide range of true dip an-
gles; yet, participants reported the regions as extending
straight back into the object. As can be seen in the fig-
ure, all of the 16 pictures have mean estimates that do
not differ significantly from 90°. Figure 7b shows the fre-
quency distribution of dip estimates across all pictures.
There was little variability in dip; 97 % of the responses
fell between 80° and 100°.
To determine if correct visual inferences can be
made when given sufficient information, we examined
performance on the Play-Doh models. The mean dip
estimate and the correct answer are shown in Fig. 8.
While there is some variation (i.e., participants are
not perfectly correct at inferring the 3D structure
when two sides are visible), 51 % of the responses fell
with 10° of the correct answer and 75 % of the re-
sponses fell within 20° of the correct answer. Thus,
when two sides were visible, observers made fairly ac-
curate inferences. Performance on this task was likely
not perfect, because interpolating the angle of an
edge defined by the intersection of two planes is chal-
lenging (Pani, William, & Shippey, 1998).
The mean number correct on the GBCT was 4.9 (SD
2.6) out of 14. The mean number correct on the Mental
Rotations Test was 8.0 (SD 5.3) out of 24. The mean an-
gular error for the Object Perspective Taking Test was
49.5 (SD 27.4). We hypothesized that students who had
high spatial reasoning performance might be more likely
to recognize that the 3D shape is unknowable from a 2D
sectional view. Three participants were excluded from
these analyses because they did not complete all spatial
measures. We conducted a stepwise multiple regression
analysis with normalized performance on our three
spatial measures. At Step 1, GBCT performance entered
into the regression and was significantly related to num-
ber of estimates [F(1,50) = 8.2, p < .01, R2 = .14], indicat-
ing that 14 % of the variance of the number of estimates
was accounted for by GBCT performance. Neither
mental rotation (t = .77, p = n.s.) nor perspective taking
(t = .63, p = n.s.) performance entered into the analysis at
Step 2, suggesting that neither test accounted for signifi-
cant variance in the number of estimates (this was true
even when these variables were entered in first). This in-
dicates that observers who are better able to infer 3Dforms from diagrams (as assessed by the GBCT) are
more likely to know that additional information is
needed to infer the orientation of a cross-sectional re-
gion. Furthermore, recognizing the ambiguity of a single
cross-section is not related to mental rotation or
perspective-taking skill. The lack of a relationship here
suggests that participants are not simply reasoning about
this task, and is consistent with the visual inference from
a cross-section being a perceptual phenomenon.Experiment 3
Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest
that observers have a prior to infer regions as extend-
ing straight back into the object. Is the prior based
on memory for the object, or is it based on the visual
information present at the surface? To address this
question, we showed observers 3D Play-Doh models
where the top surface was visible and asked how a re-
gion extended into the model. We then showed them
the correct answer (by revealing the side) and then
covered the correct answer and asked if their reports
of the dip reverted to their original report or con-
formed to their memory for the correct extension. If
the prior observed in Experiments 1 and 2 is not the
result of memory, this suggests it may be similar to
the visual inferences seen in amodal completion. Al-
though there is debate about whether high-level pro-
cesses are involved in amodal completion (Lee &
Vecera, 2005; Rauschenberger, Peterson, Mosca, &
Bruno, 2004), most work has shown that amodal
completion processes are perceptual in nature and
not influenced by knowledge (Kanizsa, 1979; Pratt
and Sekuler, 2001).
To illustrate the lack of an effect of prior knowledge
on amodal completion, we invite the reader to place a
finger over the X portion of Fig. 9. Most observers re-
port seeing a complete isosceles triangle, even though
the observer knows this to be false. Michotte and col-
leagues (1991) argued that memory does not influence
perception, and thus amodal completion is a perceptual
phenomenon in which the visual inference is hardwired
(e.g., cognitively encapsulated; Fodor, 1983). The purpose
of Experiment 3 was to examine if the prior reported
here occurs in spite of or as a function of knowledge
about the 3D properties of the specific object.
Participants viewed 13 Play-Doh models consisting of
colored layers of Play-Doh in different 3D orientations
in which only the top was visible (as shown in Fig. 10b).
We asked observers how a layer of Play-Doh extended
into the model. We then showed the correct answer
(akin to showing the X region in Fig. 9) and then cov-
ered the side again and asked participants whether the
layer had the same orientation as it had originally or if
Fig. 7 a The mean dip estimates (dark gray) for each picture along with the correct dip angle for each picture (light gray) in Experiment 2. b
Frequency distribution of responses that fell within angle bins in Experiment 2
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Fig. 8 The mean dip estimates (dark gray) along with the correct dip angle for each picture (light gray) for the Play-Doh models in Experiment 2
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orientation. Before the experiment, participants were
shown the Michotte triangle as a demonstration of see-
ing something other than what one knows is true.
If the prior observed in Experiments 1 and 2 reflects
participants’ knowledge of the object, then we would ex-
pect participants to switch their reports to be in line
with their knowledge of the correct answer. If, however,
this prior occurs in spite of knowledge (and is thus simi-
lar to amodal completion), then we would expect partici-
pants to report their original experience even though
they know the correct answer.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 42 Temple University undergraduates
(31 females) fulfilling a requirement for an introductory
psychology course. Two participants were excluded from
the analysis for not following instructions.
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of 13 Play-Doh models. As shown
in Fig. 10a, the models consisted of different colored
layers that had been folded or tilted. The models ranged
in size from 2 × 3.5 × 2.5 cm to 3 × 6 × 4 cm (height ×
width × depth).Procedure
Participants viewed 13 Play-Doh models and were
asked to distinguish between what they saw when
they looked at them and what they knew to be true
about them. They were told that what they see and
what they know might be the same or could be differ-
ent. We assured participants that there were no right
or wrong answers other than not reporting what they
experienced.
As an illustration of what was meant by “distin-
guishing between seeing and knowing,” participants
were asked what they saw when shown the Michotte
and colleagues (1991) triangle, with a piece of paper
taped over the middle that occluded the X region.
Every participant reported seeing a triangle. The
paper was then removed, and participants were asked
whether the twist in the triangle was what they were
expecting to see. Then the paper was placed back
over the X region, and participants indicated if their
perception was the same as it was originally or
whether their perception changed to reflect what they
knew was under the paper. All participants reported
seeing the original triangle.
After this demonstration, participants were shown
each Play-Doh model where only the top was visible.
The sides of the model were covered with small sheets
Fig. 9 The original form used by Michotte and colleagues (1991) to
study amodal continuation. If a finger is placed over the X,
participants report a complete isosceles triangle in spite of their
prior knowledge about the structure
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a layer was labeled with a small sticker and participants
were asked about that layer. First, they were asked
whether they perceived the layer to be present only on
the surface or as extending into the model. If observers
perceived the layer as extending in, they oriented a bar
attached to an inclinometer to show the angle of exten-
sion. An experimenter then removed the plastic covering
to show the actual angle at which the layer extended
into the model. The side was then covered back up, and
the observer was asked whether they perceived it as they
had originally (like the triangle) or whether now their
perception had changed as a result of new information
(unlike the triangle). If they had reported the layer as ex-
tending in, they oriented the bar a second time to show
the angle of extension.Fig. 10 a An example of the Play-Doh models used in Experiment 3.
b Each model was shown originally so only the top was visible to
participants. For each, a layer was indicated with a colored and
numbered sticker. Participants oriented a bar to show the angle
at which the layer extended into the modelResults and Discussion
Participants reported the layer as extending in in 78 %
of the trials. Figure 11a shows the correct dip angle and
the mean dip estimate given for each model when onlythe top was visible. Participants tended to report the
layer as extending straight back into the model. Al-
though there is greater variation in the responses to
these 3D models, it replicates the prior observed in Ex-
periments 1 and 2. As can be seen in the figure, mean
dip estimates for 10 of the 13 models do not differ from
90°. Figure 11b shows the frequency distribution of the
dip estimates across all models; 62 % of the responses
fell within 10° of 90°. This suggests that while the vari-
ability is greater with the models than with the pictures,
observers still exhibit a prior to report regions as ex-
tending straight back.
Are the visual inferences of dip angles based on mem-
ory for the object? To answer this, we examined the per-
centage of trials in which participants reported
perceiving the layer as they had originally. Participants
reported perceiving their original perception in 62 % of
the trials and reported a new orientation in 38 % of the
trials.4 This proportion is quite similar to the proportion
of trials in which subjects reported forms going straight
Fig. 11 a The mean dip estimates (dark gray) when viewing the top of the model only and correct dip angle for each model (light gray) in
Experiment 3. b Frequency distribution of responses that fell within angle bins in Experiment 3
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revealed that the proportion of participants who re-
ported their original answer was greater than expected
by chance [p < .001 (2-sided)].5
A strict perception view would expect participants
to revert to their original perception in 100 % of the
trials, whereas a strict memory or knowledge hypoth-
esis would expect participants to always switch their
report based on new knowledge. Neither of these is
supported by our data. A one-sample t test compar-
ing the mean proportion of trials in which partici-
pants reported their original perception is different
both from 100 % staying with the original perception
[t(39) = −10.1, p < .001] and from 0 % staying with
their original perception [t(39) = 17.4, p < .001].Which factors lead to a switch in participants’ re-
ports? In a follow-up analysis, we found that switch-
ing was more likely when there was a large difference
between the actual dip angle (i.e., the correct answer)
and observers’ initial estimate. Figure 12 shows a
scatterplot of the relationship between the proportion
of trials in which participants held their original per-
ception and the absolute difference between the cor-
rect answer and the mean dip estimate. The two
models where the correct answer is straight down are
removed from this analysis. As can be seen, there is a
negative relationship; observers were less likely to
stick with their original estimate when there was a
larger difference between the correct answer and their
initial report. This is perhaps the result of some
Fig. 12 A scatterplot of the relationship between the proportion of trials in which participants stayed with their original response and the
absolute difference in degrees between the mean estimate and the true estimate for each model
Fig. 13 The toy box stimulus used in Experiment 4. Participants were
asked about the presence of Legos inside the toy box and were told
that the Legos were indeed inside and asked to place a bar on the line
and indicate where they guessed the Legos would be
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switching requiring further examination.
In sum, the prior to report regions as extending straight
back often occurs despite knowledge that it does not. This
suggests that this prior is similar to other examples of
amodal perception, such as the Michotte Triangle.
Experiment 4
It is possible that this effect hinges on demand charac-
teristics; when observers are asked about the inside of an
object that they have no information about, they have a
response bias to say the region extends straight back. To
address this, we asked if participants would be willing to
make a commitment about the location of an object
without any visual support.
Observers viewed pictures of the outsides of objects
that were likely to contain different objects inside (e.g., a
toy box, suitcase, grocery store) but where no visual in-
formation about the “inside” object was provided. For
each picture, observers were asked if a specific object
was inside (Are Legos inside this toy box? Is a tooth-
brush inside this suitcase? Is a cashier inside this store?).
They were then told the specific object was inside and
then asked to indicate where it was. If participants are
biased to report that any structure is straight back from
a surface, then we would expect the distribution of re-
sponses to clustered around 90°. If there is no bias, then
we would expect their estimates to be widely distributed.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 20 Temple University undergraduates
(12 females) fulfilling a requirement for an introductory
psychology course.Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of 16 color photographs of com-
mon objects or settings. These included 1 practice pic-
ture and 15 experimental pictures. Four were from the
set used in Experiments 1 and 2, and 11 were new. The
new stimuli consisted of pictures of the outsides of ob-
jects where another object could be inside: toy box, suit-
case, grocery store, oven, glue stick tube, board game,
house, refrigerator, wall, piggy bank, and pregnant
woman’s torso. For each picture, we asked whether a
specific object was inside. The stimuli-object parings fell
into two classes: parings for which (a) the object was
likely inside but its location was unknown (i.e., a cashier
inside a store) and (b) it was impossible to tell whether
the object was inside or not (i.e., Legos inside a toy box).
As shown in Fig. 13, each image contained a red line
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estimate. The images were approximately 24 × 36 cm in
size.Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a 21-inch Mac desktop com-
puter (Apple, Cupertino, CA, USA). Participants were
seated approximately 45 cm away from the screen.Procedure
The procedure was similar to that in Experiment 2, with
the following exceptions. Observers were shown 16 pic-
tures. For each, they were asked whether a specific ob-
ject was inside and selected one of the following answer
choices and then indicated their confidence: (1) yes, the
object is inside and I can use the bar to show you where
it is; (2) yes, the object is inside but from the picture I
cannot tell where it is; (3) from the picture I cannot tell
whether the object is inside; or (4) no, the object is not
inside. If Choice 1 was selected, they used the bar with
inclinometer to indicate the location of the object. After
they had made their selections for all pictures, they were
told that the object was inside and asked to guess about
the location by orienting the bar.Results and Discussion
Participants were fairly confident in their responses;
mean confidence was 4.0 (SD 1.0). In 84 % of the trials,
participants indicated that they could not tell the loca-
tion of the object from the picture (either by selecting
cannot know the location or cannot know at all whether
the object is there). Estimates of location were given in
11 % of the trials, and observers reported that the object
was not inside in 5 % of the trials. Clearly, participants
are not willing to make an estimate without perceptual
support.
Mean dip estimates for each picture are shown in
Fig. 14a, and the distribution of responses is shown in
Fig. 14b (collapsing across trials in which participants
were required to make an estimate and the trials in which
they chose to make one). As can be seen from the figure,
the average of the estimates is close to 90°. However, the
distribution of responses does not cluster within 10° of
90°. Indeed, only 25 % of the responses fell within 10° of
90°; observers’ estimates ranged from 16° to 160°.
These findings suggest that the prior observed in the
previous experiments cannot be explained by partici-
pants’ response biases. When there is no obvious per-
ceptual information related to an object at the surface,
observers do not make commitments about its interior
location.General Discussion
How do observers make inferences about the interior
3D structure of objects from information visible on
the surface? We found that observers appear (a) un-
aware that the 3D structure cannot be inferred from
a cross-section and (b) to have a prior to infer that a
layer on a cross-section at the surface extends
straight back into the object. This was true for both
photographs of single surfaces (Experiments 1 and 2)
and for 3D objects (Experiment 3). Experiment 2
showed that, when provided with two sides and thus
enough evidence to infer how the region extends into
the object, observers can solve the task. However, in
the absence of sufficient evidence (i.e., only a single
cross-sectional view), perception appears to be gov-
erned by this prior. Experiment 3 suggests that this
prior is not easily influenced by knowledge of the ob-
ject, and thus appears to be perceptual in nature,
similar to amodal completion. Experiment 4 showed
that participants’ reports are unlikely to be the result
of a response strategy to say “straight in” for anything
that is inside an object, as this prior was not evident
in the absence of visual information about the inter-
ior structure. Finally, while all observers showed a
similar prior, observers who scored high on a separate
measure of inferring 3D structure from multiple sides
were more likely to recognize that inferring the 3D
structure was not possible from a single cross-section
alone.
Humans can show significant errors in reasoning
about physically transforming objects (McCloskey,
1983; Pani, 1997). We argue that the prior observed
here is perceptual in nature rather than a function of
the observer’s knowledge or general reasoning based
on findings across the experiments. In Experiment 3,
even when participants were shown how a region ex-
tended into the object (i.e., the correct answer), they
tended to return to the original report when that in-
formation (i.e., the correct answer) was no longer vis-
ible. This observation suggests a clear similarity to
amodal perception (Kanizsa, 1979; Michotte et al.,
1964), where completion occurs in spite of partici-
pants’ knowledge of the object. These reports cannot
be accounted for by demand characteristics or general
beliefs about where things are inside objects; in Ex-
periment 4, participants did not make commitments
about the orientation of the interior region in the ab-
sence of visual information at the surface. Finally, in
Experiments 1 and 2, we found no evidence that skill
in reasoning about spatial problems was related to
the prior; individuals’ ability to mentally simulate
complex events (e.g., object rotation or view from a
new perspective) did not appear to be related to their
reporting structures projecting straight into a volume.
Fig. 14 a The mean dip estimates in Experiment 4. b Frequency distribution of responses that fell within angle bins in Experiment 4
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spatial reasoning to infer the spatial relationships be-
tween the cross-sectional plane and the intersecting
interior plane.Is This a Form of Amodal Completion?
The observation that the prior is not easily influenced by
knowledge of the object’s form shows a similarity to
other examples of amodal completion, such as the
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supports a visual inference to uniquely extend volumet-
ric representations into regions where the form is not
visible. We propose this as an example of amodal exten-
sion in depth. A number of studies have documented
amodal completion in depth (Gerbino & Zabai, 2003;
Palmer, Kellman, & Shipley, 2006; Tse, 1999; Van Lier
and Wagemans, 1999). However, these are cases of amo-
dal interpolation, where contour or surface completion
links two visually specified regions. The extension re-
ported here represents extrapolation. Extrapolation can
occur in both amodal (Kanizsa, 1979) and modal dis-
plays (Shipley & Kellman, 2003).
Modal extrapolation is limited in extent (Kanizsa,
1979). So, too, the phenomenon reported here may show
similar limits. Our evidence shows that the extension of
a region into three dimensions governed by a prior con-
tinues from the immediate surface back into the object.
We do not assess the shape of the extension or its pres-
ence deep inside the volume. We note anecdotally that
the raisins in Fig. 2 do not appear to be raisin tubes.
Here it is possible that the visual system continues a
curved surface to close the raisin volume. How deeply a
single surface would be extrapolated is an open question,
and these limits may be examined in further research.
Importantly, the extrapolation we report here does not
begin from a visually specified edge and continue from
that edge; here extrapolation begins at an edge on a sur-
face and proceeds perpendicularly to that surface into
regions that are not visible. This is reminiscent of illu-
sory contours that appear perpendicular to line ends
(Kennedy, 1978). Perhaps there is a surface analogue to
end-stopped cells (Heitger, Rosenthaler, Von Der Heydt,
Peterhans, & Kübler, 1992) that play a role in binding fa-
ceted surfaces into single objects. When a surface ends,
our data suggest that, rather than representing this re-
gion as dimensionless, the visual system has a prior to
represent, perhaps automatically, an orthogonal surface
at the boundary. Although these suggestions are highly
speculative, the critical finding invites a new question:
How does the visual system construct a representation of
3D form that extends into a volume? Our aim is not to
offer a new theory, but instead to suggest that the types of
visual inferences reported here need to be explained by
any theory of visual completion. We document the system-
atic nature of these types of inferences with the hope of
bringing this research to the attention of the community.
How Does the Visual System Represent 3D Interior
Structures?
The present work does offer a few hints that may help
develop a full model of this process. As has been found
in research on other shape-from-X cues, the visual sys-
tem appears to follow some fundamental constraintsthat allow a unique solution when there is the potential
for many-to-one mappings. For example, a rigidity con-
straint allows the visual system to recover shape from
motion patterns (Wallach & O’Connell, 1953; see also
Sperling, Landy, Dosher & Perkins, 1989; Mather, 1989;
Richards et al., 1987), and closure and smoothness
constraints allow inferences of 3D shape from 2D silhou-
ettes (Richards et al., 1987). Here the finding that, for
single surfaces, observers tend to report the interior
forms as extending straight back into the object suggests
a visual constraint that may help solve the inference
problem for multiple potential surfaces. The present re-
search suggests a default constraint, or prior, where in-
terior structures extend orthogonally to exterior surfaces
(unless there is contradictory evidence). Thus, in the
cases in Experiments 2 and 3, where two cross-sections
were visible, the interior structures may result from simul-
taneous extrapolations from two cross-sectional surfaces.
It is perhaps worth emphasizing that the observed
prior, to infer regions as extending straight back, is not
trivial. The system could have no prior, with wide-
ranging estimates of interior structures across or within
individuals. Alternatively, no structure could be seen
when there is insufficient evidence to determine the 3D
form. If indeed the phenomenon is perceptual in nature,
seeing a structure as extending straight down may be
analogous to seeing the shortest path in apparent mo-
tion; it may be “sensible” and minimize error between
guess and reality, but nonetheless it requires a theoret-
ical explanation.
Relationship to Science, Technology, Engineering, and
Math (STEM) Education
This research project arose from a collaboration that
encompassed cognitive science and the geosciences
(Shipley, Tikoff, Ormand, & Manduca, 2013). The
illusion that geological features extend straight back into
an outcrop is exciting because it may be revealing about
previously unrecognized underlying visual processes;
however, such illusions are a practical challenge for
STEM education. The need to think about the interior
3D structure from surface views is common in medicine
(e.g., ultrasounds, CT and MRI scans; Chariker, Naaz, &
Pani, 2011; Hegarty, Keehner, Cohen, Montello, & Lippa,
2007; Wu, Klatzky, & Stetten, 2010, 2012), mathematics
(e.g., conical sections), crystallography (e.g., a sectional
view of atoms in a solid), biology (thin sections; LeClair,
2003), dentistry (Hegarty, Keehner, Khooshabeh, & Mon-
tello, 2009), and the geosciences (Kali & Orion, 1996).
It is important that teachers recognize that students
have a tendency to infer that regions in a cross-section
extend straight back into objects. Experts likely avoid
simple versions of this error, but see Shipley and Tikoff
(2016) for an example that we interpret as a case where
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are aware of the potential to make this error will be
more likely to succeed and continue in the discipline;
the relationship between understanding 3D relationships
and recognizing the ambiguity we found in Experiment
2 is consistent with such a hypothesis. If so, developing
interventions that help students overcome this error
may contribute to expanding STEM education. One po-
tential intervention may be training an understanding of
the relationship between cross-sections and 3D struc-
tures. Naaz, Chariker, and Pani (2014) found that stu-
dents given sufficient training could accurately go back
and forth between 3D whole-brain representations and
2D neuroanatomical cross-sections. The role of learning
about 3D structures and their cross-sections is an im-
portant direction for future research in this area.Conclusions
Participants tend to perceive regions visible in a cross-
section as being 3D and extending back into the object
at 90°. We suggest that this inference represents a form
of amodal completion, amodal extrapolation, which has
previously been unrecognized. We argue that this find-
ing reveals constraints within the visual processes that
serve perception of objects. The aim of this paper is to
bring this phenomenon to the attention of the percep-
tion community and to illustrate the important connec-
tion between basic psychological research and STEM
practice and education. By working in an interdisciplin-
ary group on students’ struggles to comprehend complex
spatial information, one reveals aspects of the human
mind that cognitive science has yet to recognize.Endnotes
1Here we borrow a term from the earth sciences: tech-
nically dip, or dip angle, is the steepest angle of descent
of a feature relative to a horizontal plane. Here we use
the term to refer to the angle of descent into an object
relative to the surface plane of that object.
2This was true when the analysis included all dip esti-
mates, and when the analysis was restricted to only the
dip estimates reported when the picture was accurately
identified.
3We note that this error is higher than the angular
error reported by Kozhevnikov and Hegarty (2001) (33.2,
SD 23.3), but we have no obvious explanation for the el-
evated error.
4There were two models for which the layer extended
straight down. When those models were removed from
this analysis, participants still reported the orientation of
the layer as having the one they had originally reported
in 61 % of the trials.5This was the case both when all models were entered
into the analysis and when the two models where the
layer extended straight down were excluded.
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